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1. Introduction 
The Socio-Economic Scenarios for Climate Change Assessments project will provide 
socio-economic scenario resources for climate impacts and adaptation research and  
policy in The Netherlands. The scenarios and scenario resources (storylines, parameter 
values, numerical and simulation models and process guidance) will be designed with 
and for stakeholders in two BSIK Programmes Klimaat voor Ruimte (KvR) and Leven 
met Water (LmW). These stakeholders include researchers, as well as principal users of 
KvR and LmW research in Government agencies, the private sector and NGOs. The  
project is stakeholder-driven and synthetic, drawing on existing scenarios, including the 
Welvaart en Leefomgeving (WLO, 2006) scenarios developed by MNP, CPB and RPB. 
The definition of a scenario used in the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005: xvii) 
is: 
‘Scenarios are plausible, challenging and relevant sets of stories about how the 
future might unfold. They are generally developed to help decision-makers  
understand the wide range of possible futures, confront uncertainties and under-
stand how decisions made now may play out in the future.’ 
Climatic change is both anthropogenically-forced and has impacts on biophysical and 
socio-economic systems. A defining characteristic of changes in climate is that they are 
likely to occur over the long-term – periods measured in decades and centuries. Under-
standing the likely possible course of climatic change therefore requires, on the one 
hand, long-term projections of anthropogenic forcing in terms of global emissions of 
greenhouse gases (GHG). For this purpose the IPCC and many others have developed 
emissions scenarios based on assumptions about energy supply and demand, and the 
structure of energy supply systems. 
On the other hand, in order to assess the possible vulnerability of eco- and social systems 
to future climatic change and to calculate damage costs, it is also necessary to build up a 
picture of the future societies and economies that may be impacted by climatic change. It 
is evident that economic growth, demographic change, technological change, changes in 
governance, changes in lifestyle and so on will influence the vulnerability to climatic 
change impacts of different groups in The Netherlands and internationally. We would 
also expect he capacity of these groups to adapt to reduce their exposure to new risks, to 
be able to respond to negative impacts and to take advantage of new opportunities 
emerging from climatic change to evolve through time. On these grounds, it is not suffi-
cient to assume, as many early climate impact studies did, that the future resembles the 
present. 
For this reason there is a need for socio-economic scenarios to inform research and  
policy related to climatic impacts and adaptation. These scenarios can build on the  
foundations of earlier scenario exercises, but need to be tailored to the specific needs of 
climate assessments.  
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The objectives of this report are: 
• To review social and economic scenarios relevant to integrated climate change 
assessments;  
• To make recommendations for good practice; and 
• To reflect on key issues in the use of scenarios in climate assessment. 
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2.  A brief history of scenarios 
The ‘futures’ literature related to climate change is not well organised.1 Broadly we can 
identify ‘global’ scenarios and more specific, ‘domain’ scenarios. The boundary between 
what to leave in and what to leave out is also not always clear. Government departments 
in all countries and many industrial companies use projections and scenarios for plan-
ning purposes. Environmental research also increasingly uses scenario approaches. We 
have chosen to include only studies that appear to have a significance in relation to  
climate impacts and adaptation research. 
2.1 Scenarios studies relevant to the environment 
Scenarios have been used since the 1970s to bring the issue of environmental damage 
and resource use to the attention of policy makers and the general public.2 In general, the 
aim of these studies was to illustrate the negative consequences of continuing to develop 
economically with a ‘business as usual’ scenario. Limits to Growth came at a time of 
great fear about scarcity of mineral and key renewable resources and was an important 
influence on the first wave of environmentalism and environmental policy. These early 
studies also made the argument that the rate of economic, technological and social 
changes was accelerating, that socio-economic systems were becoming increasingly  
embedded in ecological systems, and that this meant increasing uncertainty about what 
the future held. These features are all shared with contemporary studies. 
By the early 1980s it was clear that many of the predictions contained in these studies 
would not be fulfilled. In addition, government policy and ideology became less sympa-
thetic to the idea of long-range planning and intervention. Interest in scenario exercise 
waned at a time of more rapid economic growth in the OECD, falling raw materials and 
energy prices, and declining interest in environmental issues, with one exception. The oil 
and gas industry, having created scenarios and long-range planning capabilities during 
the 1970s continued to develop and apply them to strategic decision-making. Much  
current interest in environmentally-relevant scenarios is related to expertise accumulated 
during this period in the oil industry. 
The second environmentalist wave beginning in the late 1980s did not immediately lead 
to renewed interest in long-range scenarios.  
 
 
                                                   
1 One recent review of scenario studies relevant to climate assessment in The Netherlands is:  
Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Brief van de minister van volkshuisvesting, ruimtelijke 
ordening en milieubeheer, XXI-G, Den Haag, 8 november 2005. 
2 Early studies include: Meadows, D.H., Meadows, D.L., Randers, J. and Behrens W.W. (1972), 
Limits to Growth, Basic Books, New York; M.D. Mesarovic and E. Pestel (1974) Mankind at 
the Turning Point, Dutton, New York; H. Kahn and A. Wiener (1967) The Year 2000,  
Macmillan, New York; G.O. Barney (1980) The Global 2000 Report to the President of the 
US, Entering the 21st Century, USGPO, Washington DC. 
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However, as the global and long-term nature of the new environmental agenda became 
clearer, and the need for long-range projections to make policy on problems such as 
acidification, ozone depletion and climate change became more obvious, there has been 
a greater interest in scenarios since the early-1990s. With the progressive development 
and implementation of policies for sustainable development, with its stress on integrated 
and long-term approaches to environmental, social and economic policy, the use of  
scenarios has become all-but universal in environmental policy and sustainability  
assessments.3 
Classes of Scenario 
A wide range of different scenario exercises have been identified in the literature, each 
with different aims, approaches and outputs.4 For simplicity, we have classified these 
into two classes: global and domain. We have also surveyed studies with projections 
which do not constitute scenarios, but which were relevant to the construction of contex-
tual scenarios. 
Global scenarios are exercises that provide an integrated picture of future developments 
and they are frequently used to frame global assessments of environmental problems (for 
example, climate change (IPCC) and biodiversity (MA)). By implication, they are con-
cerned with characterising multiple driving forces and contexts for change in the future. 
The main results include both specific projections (GHG emissions rates) and statements 
about the general state or capacity of global economic or ecological systems. Many 
global scenarios share common intellectual roots, share convergent visions of the future 
(see Figure 1) and have applied the scenario-axis technique.5 
National scenarios are an intermediate and less common category of scenarios. Here the 
work of the Dutch planbureaus and government research agencies (CPB, RPB, RIVM, 
ECN and MNP) stand out. Scenarios are especially strongly represented in Dutch policy-
making at various governance levels.6 A recent inventory of Dutch scenarios counted 
150 publicly available scenario reports.7 The major Welvaart en Leefomgeving (WLO, 
2006) study, a collaboration between the CPB, MNP and RPB, is an especially broad-
based domain scenario study and is the outcome of this major investment in scenario 
studies in The Netherlands over the past decade or more.8 
                                                   
3 The primary global scenarios applied to environment ans sustainability have been: Global  
Scenarios Group Scenarios (Gallopin, 1997); The Special Report on Emissions Scenarios 
(SRES, 2000); and the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA, 2005). 
4 For recent reviews see: MA (2005) Volume 2: Ecosystems and Human Well-Being, Island Press, 
Washington DC; and T. Parson et al. (2006) Global Change Scenarios: Their Development 
and Use, US Climate Change Science Progam, Washington DC. 
5 S.A. van ’t Klooster and M.B.A. van Asselt (2006) Practising the scenario-axis technique,  
Futures, 38: 15-30. 
6 Key among these are two CPB studies: Tang, P. and R. de Mooij (2003) Four Futures of 
Europe, CPB: den Haag; and Huizinga, F. and B. Smid (2004) Vier vergezichten op Neder-
land, productie, arbied en sectorstructuur in vier scenario’s tot 2040, CPB: Den Haag. 
7 See also: www.toekomstverkenning.nl. 
8 CPB/MNP/RPB (2006) Welvaart en Leefomgeving, Den Haag. 
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Figure 2.1 Global Scenarios compared9. 
 
Domain scenarios are generally concerned with developments around single issues or 
domains. These may also be concerned with several driving forces and contexts at local, 
national and international levels, but they are typically more tightly-defined and less  
integrative in approach than global scenarios. The level of specification and quantifica-
tion tends to be higher, and the focus is on narratives and projections for key variables 
(growth in transport or declines in environmental quality, for instance). 
Scenario Study Objectives and Approaches 
The underlying rationale of futures studies has shifted between the 1970s and 1990s 
from being predictive, to being what the French call prospective: to illuminate choices of 
the present in the light of ‘possible futures’.10 The aim is ‘...to clarify alternative world 
views and challenge conventional wisdom...’.11 Good prospective studies are not neces-
sarily those that are realised, but those which ‘...lead to action, avoiding the dangers, and 
arrive at the desired objective.’12 One presumption underlying the work of the  
Prospective School was that the more specific the scenario, the more likely it is to lead to 
action. While ‘global’ scenarios may have an important role in providing the frame for 
integrated assessments, they tend to have limited direct impact on the decisions of  
policymakers, or the actions of organisations and individuals may be hard to measure. 
Domain scenarios are more likely to have such impacts on public and private sector  
decisions. The benefit of global scenarios is that they provide a context for nested  
                                                   
9 MA, op cit.: 42. 
10 M. Godet and F. Roubelat (1996) Creating the Future: The Use and Misuse of Scenarios, Long 
Range Planning, 29, 2: 164-171. 
11 G.C. Gallopin and P. Raskin (1998) Windows on the Future: Global Scenarios and Sustainabil-
ity, Environment, 40, 3, April: 6-31. 
12 op cit. p 164. 
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sectoral scenarios and projections, while permitting a more critical and imaginative  
attitude to analysis. 
Dimensions of Change: Global and National Studies 
Global futures studies are complex imaginative accomplishments. They are distinguished 
by being multidimensional, in the sense of being concerned with many underlying  
factors causing change in society and the economy of countries and global regions. Five 
main dimensions of change can be identified in these studies: economic development; 
the nature of governance; technological change; demographic change and social 
change.13 
Economic Development 
Economic development refers both to assumptions about the rate of economic develop-
ment, measured in most studies in terms of gross world product (GWP) or gross  
domestic product (GDP) growth,14 and the nature of economic development. Average 
rates of economic growth generally fall in the range of 1.5 -3.5 percent per year. This is a 
relatively unproblematic range based on long-term experience in the world economy. 
However, compounded over long time periods, small differences in growth assumptions 
will have a major effect on supply and demand assumptions for key environmental  
services. 
The nature of economic change and its relationship with governance has also become a 
concern of many global scenario exercises. In particular, a dichotomy is explored  
between economic systems that are relatively more open and globalised, and economic 
systems that are shaped more strongly by social, political (and environmental)  
objectives. A trade-off is typically assumed to exist between the rate of economic growth 
and the quality of social and environmental development, although globalised ‘sustain-
able development’ scenarios argue that a reconciliation of the two objectives is possible, 
primarily through a focus on alternative technological paths and consumer behaviour. 
Nature of Governance 
Forms of socialised or communal economic development do not feature much in current 
scenarios. However, very different attitudes to the role of different levels of governance 
have become a concern. In general, the national government as the primary authority 
structure is seen as under threat, either by globalising capitalism, or by the rise of power-
ful international organisations (including the European Commission). In general,  
persistence of state authority is equated with politically less stable futures as in the  
‘Barbarization’ scenario in Gallopin et al. (1997),15 the ‘Rough Neighbours’  
                                                   
13 SPRU/CSERGE/CRU/PSI, Socio-Economic Futures Scenarios for Climate Impact  
Assessment: Non-Climate Futures Study, SPRU: University of Sussex, November 1999. 
14 The WBCSD scenarios use an alternative measure, Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare 
(ISEW). 
15 Gallopin, G.C, Hammond, A., Raskin, R., and Swart, R (1997). Branch Points: Global  
Scenarios and Human Choice. Stockholm Environment Institute, PoleStar Series Report no. 7. 
Stockholm. 
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scenario in Chatham House (1996), ‘Battlefield’ in CEC DGXVII (1993)16, B1 scenario 
in SRES (2000) and ‘Order from Strength’ in MA (2005). 
Once again, two poles can be identified. In the first, governance structures become  
increasingly globalised and shared between states and interest groups. This is in response 
to greater needs for co-ordination and management of the global system, partly because 
of threats to its stability and the need to manage global environmental services collabora-
tively. The WBCSD ‘Geo-Polity’ scenario (1998) is an example of this, being a response 
to the shift of economic power and cultural values to Asia. In the second, international 
institutions remain weak compared with nation states which are unwilling to cede power 
to them. The capacity to respond to global environmental problems are therefore limited, 
and international relations continue to be dominated by states pursuing their own  
interests. 
Technological Change 
Technological change is widely regarded as a fundamental driver of economic and  
political change at the global level. However, it plays a less consistent role in the futures 
studies surveyed. At the more qualitative end, technology is treated as a second-order 
problem, dealt with more in terms of the general rate and direction of technological 
change towards or away from more innovative technologies. 
More focused, quantitative studies take technological change as central in scenario-
building. Typically this is in the form of substitutions (substitutions of fuel types and 
power technologies in energy scenarios), and assumptions about the rates of improve-
ment of materials or energy efficiency in industrial systems. These technological  
assumptions can have a marked impact on results. For instance, much of the variance in 
performance of the family of four SRES A1 (IPCC, 2000) scenarios is due to differing 
assumptions about resource and technology mixes, rather than assumptions about  
economic development or governance. A general lesson appears to be that the more  
specific a scenario, to the extent that well-defined technological alternatives can be  
identified, the greater the final impact of technological assumptions. 
Social Change 
In general, global scenarios are less concerned with the ‘demand’ side of the economy 
and society than with the ‘supply’ side in assessing the drivers of future changes. To this 
extent they may be seen as economically, politically or technologically deterministic. 
Social and cultural changes affecting the demand for goods and services are dealt with 
less consistently, although many of the more idealised scenarios rely on substantially 
changed value systems prevailing in government, private enterprise and amongst citizens 
and consumers. The demand side is better represented in domain studies related to  
energy, transport and the built environment where prices, energy intensity and demand 
for transport and housing are better understood. 
Demographic Change 
                                                   
16 European Commission (1993). Global Perspective 2010: Tasks for Science and Technology. 
Report for the EC FAST Programme. 
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Population is one factor which will determine final demand, and this is the best charac-
terised of future developments. A long tradition of modelling, systematic collection of 
population data, and ‘demographic inertia’ whereby future fertility rates can be accu-
rately forecast on the basis of the structure of current populations, all mean that there 
tends to be less dispute about total numbers of people and their distribution between  
regions of the world. This does not mean that large changes in forecast population num-
bers do not occur. Over the past 10 years there has been a consistent need to adjust popu-
lation forecasts as a result of behaviour change, and the impacts of population policy and 
disease. Demographic change was also taken as a starting point in recent Dutch scenarios 
studies – although here too adjustments have recently become necessary. 
Indicators of Change 
The level of quantification in global studies varies greatly. Some avoid quantification  
altogether, most use a small set of indicators to show change in system states, and a few 
are highly quantified. There has been a tendency towards greater quantification through 
time, with many scenario studies now being underpinned by demographic and economic 
models. Opportunities for quantification appear to depend on the role played by socio-
economic dimensions in scenarios. Some dimensions (globalisation, equity, behaviour) 
are difficult to quantify, and their impacts on quantifiable factors of future development 
are seldom well-understood. Apart from this, there are differing attitudes to the use of 
quantified indicators to illuminate storylines. Different scenario user-groups have vary-
ing needs for the exploratory and visionary aspects provided by storylines, as opposed to 
concreteness and consistency offered by indicators and model outputs. 
Domain Studies 
Domain studies cover a wide range of sectors and interest domains including: Energy; 
Transport; Agriculture and Food; Built Environment; and Environment and Climate. The 
most comprehensive domain scenarios studies exist for the energy sector. Especially 
noteworthy are energy scenarios done on behalf of the European Commission, the  
International Energy Agency (OECD/IEA), the US Energy Information Agency,  
scenarios conducted for large energy-producing companies such as Shell and BP (often 
only partially in the public domain), and energy and emissions scenarios done for the 
IPCC (IPCC, 2000). These studies include both traditional forecasts, as well as scenario 
exercises. Energy, as a key, politically-sensitive, technologically mature and concen-
trated industry, based on well-known resources and with clear and easily measurable  
environmental burdens is perhaps the ideal sector for scenarios studies. The structure of 
demand is well understood (growth of about 1 percent per year in the EU), and the key 
questions are about improvements in the efficiency of energy supply and use, the  
penetration of radical new renewables technologies, and the capacity to secure new 
sources of fossil fuels. 
Transport has many similar characteristics to energy, but scenario studies have been  
considerably less numerous and sophisticated. Forecasts of the demand for transport of 
people and freight are at the centre of these studies, and in general they are cautious 
about modal shifts and the penetration of radical new technologies. Interest in emissions 
from vehicles has risen substantially since the 1990s in relation to climate change and air 
quality management policies. 
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3. Socio-economic scenarios in climate assessments 
Climate impact and adaptation assessments are concerned with understanding changes in 
natural and socio-economic systems that may be attributed to anthropogenically-caused 
changes in the climate. Two strategies are used in mainstream climate assessments to 
cope with the complexity of the relationship between climate and society. First, assess-
ment studies have sought to reduce complexity by looking at limited aspects of a subset 
of potential future conditions. Early studies focused entirely on physical impacts of  
climatic conditions on natural processes17. In general, these studies examined a few  
exposure units and climate change scenarios (typically based on doubling of atmospheric 
carbon dioxide). Second, those studies which did include socio-economic conditions 
considered them either as ‘static’ (in the sense of being a continuation of the present), or 
analogies in space (i.e. a comparison between comparable cases in the present) and/or 
time (comparison with cases in history). The Feedback mechanisms between the socio-
economic and the climatic system (e.g. adaptation strategies) tend to be disregarded,  
although there is a recognition that the scale of an impact will be dependent on the level 
of social response – vulnerability and adaptation are linked to each other. To summarise, 
the prevailing literature assumes that socio-economic and climate systems are separable 
for the purposes of climate assessment, and assumes that socio-economic conditions can 
be held constant. 
However, climate assessment must take account of change in socio-economic systems18. 
Without this, assessment will remain one-dimensional (i.e. relating only to climate  
variables). The commensurate change in social and economic systems, which will to a 
large extent condition their sensitivity and vulnerability, could be overlooked. Three 
epistemological problems must be overcome. First, climate assessments must account for 
agency and reflexivity in social systems. Social systems are unpredictable because  
humans are uniquely capable of altering their environment, and because in acting on 
their environment, they are being reflexive. Some aspects of change – population,  
mortality etc. – are relatively easy to model, providing the basis for long-term predic-
tions. Some social scientists (i.e. rational choice political scientists and economists) seek 
to model other aspects of human behaviour (e.g. the choice between certain courses of 
action) albeit in simplified social settings. But many other facets of social reality (and the 
future) – e.g. the development of cultural norms, values and beliefs – defy this type of 
analytical treatment. Efforts to make predictions in economics, political science and  
sociology tend to reduce complexity, but in doing so lose vital qualitative aspects of the 
                                                   
17  Arnell, N.W. 1998. Climatic change and water resources in Britain. Climatic Change, 39,  
83-110; Stakhiv, E. Z. 1998. Policy implications of climate change impacts for water  
resources management. Water Policy, 1, 157-175; Bentham, G and Langford, I.H. 1995.  
Climate change and the incidence of food poisoning in England and Wales. Int J. Biomet., 
39, 81-86. 
18  Berkhout, F., Hertin, J. and Jordan, A., Socio-economic futures in climate change impact  
assessment: using scenarios as ‘learning machines’, Global Environmental Change, vol 12, 
no 2, 2002: 83-95. 
. 
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worlds they seek to portray – political interaction, norm formation, debate, advocacy – 
which shape socio-economic futures. The ability to quantify future impacts is therefore 
fundamentally constrained. 
A second problem may be called the ‘mismatch of futures’. In general, the natural  
sciences make well-founded assumptions of continuity and universality. Natural  
phenomena are assumed to behave in the same way, ceteris paribus, whenever and wher-
ever they occur. Most scientists also hold to the positivist claim that as knowledge accu-
mulates, more will be known and the models used to explain natural phenomena will be 
improved. This expectation extends also to natural processes that represent a departure 
from long-term average conditions, and to events like thresholds and other non-linear 
events (such as a collapse of the thermohaline circulation). As knowledge accumulates, 
there is a general expectation that better predictions of the evolution of a broader set of 
climate variables will be possible at progressively finer resolutions. This confidence does 
not extend to the social sciences, mainly because the assumptions of continuity and  
universality do not hold in many (and perhaps progressively fewer) social, political and 
economic systems. Although over short periods of time many important structures,  
processes and attitudes are stable, over longer periods of time we are aware that social 
and economic relationships change, and that institutional and technological innovations 
profoundly modify incentives, behaviours and social structures. Usually these processes 
of change are unexpected and poorly understood by participants, even as they are  
occurring. 
Third, the framing of impact assessments must themselves be placed into some social 
and political context. Social studies of science have long emphasised that scientific 
knowledge cannot be understood independently of the social context in which it is  
produced. The post-modern turn in social inquiry “…rejects all truth claims, accepting 
that there are multiple realities and no foundations for asserting the superiority on one  
interpretation over another”19. ‘Scientific facts’ are constructed through social processes 
and rituals. What is accepted as knowledge and what constitutes good scientific practice 
is the outcome of processes of negotiation within frameworks of power and authority. 
All research is framed by assumptions, discourses and interests, including those of the 
scientists involved. What has been shown for a wide range of academic fields is particu-
larly relevant in climate assessment. Partly as a result of complexity and uncertainty,  
results are shaped by necessary choices regarding spatial and regional scales, exposure 
units, types of impacts to be examined, ways in which they are expressed and so on. 
Specific interests (political, economic, cultural) colour pictures of the future because 
they imply winners and losers. The way in which these affect study results remains 
largely concealed from policy and other audiences. 
These inter-related problems of agency, discontinuity and framing pose immense  
challenges for the analysis of future social time in climate impact assessment. Recent  
research has tended to make three arguments20. First, studies which seek to assess future 
impacts of and adaptation to climate change need to look at a range of different future 
                                                   
19  Rhodes, R. (1997) Understanding governance. Open University Press, Buckingham: 184. 
20 Parson, E.A. et al. (2006) Global Change Scenarios: Their Development and Use, US Climate 
Change Science Program, Draft for Public Comment, June 30th. 
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socio-economic conditions. Imposing future climate on only one (current or future) set of 
economic, technological and social conditions does not give a broad-enough representa-
tion of possible outcomes. This approach downplays rather than explores the various 
sources of uncertainty, and compresses rather than reveals different interpretations of  
reality. 
Second, qualitative analysis and participatory approaches should be given a more promi-
nent role. Climate assessments should be understood as a joint learning process between 
researchers and stakeholders, aiming to better understand the mechanisms of climatic  
effects and how they may be avoided or adapted to. This also implies taking social and 
economic conditions may be taken as a starting point, with climate change added as a 
new variable. This process inverts the logic of assessments which foreground climate 
variability and change. 
Third, climate assessment studies need to make underlying assumptions more trans-
parent. New tools and wider participation in studies is leading to a broader and more  
integrated comparison of potential impacts and policy options. Researchers should re-
present uncertainties and acknowledge the limits of knowledge more explicitly, while 
not being overwhelmed by uncertainty and ignorance about the future. Assessments 
should be used and presented as heuristic tools, drawing on knowledges and experience 
of diverse stakeholder groups and encouraging learning. 
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4. Development of socio-economic scenario studies for 
climate assessment 
In a recent assessment by the US Climate Change Science Programme (Parson et al. 
2006), this more generic function of socio-economic scenarios is acknowledged and 
placed in the context of other forms of scenario (see Figure 2 below). The assessment  
argues that while in the past there was a simple linear progression from socio-economic 
scenarios to emission scenarios and so on, it is now widely recognised that socio-
economic scenarios also lie at the heart of impacts assessment. 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
CONDITIONS
•population
•GDP
•energy system
•industry
•technology
•agriculture
•land use
•…
ATMOSPHERE &
CLIMATE
•carbon cycle
•temperature
•precipitation
•humidity
•soil moisture
•extreme events
•…
DIRECT
BIOPHYSICAL 
IMPACTS
•sea level rise
•freshwater
•ecosystems
•…
EMISSIONS
•greenhouse 
gases
•aerosols
•other drivers, 
eg. land cover 
change
•…
OTHER 
IMPACTS
•agriculture
•human health
•property
•infrastructure
•…
Content of scenarios          Underlying assumptions of scenarios                                 Use of scenarios
 
Figure 4.1 Scenarios for climate impact assessment (Parson et al., 2006)21 
A set of socio-economic scenarios were developed by the UK Climate Impacts  
Programme for the United Kingdom.22 The scenarios framework drew on earlier  
scenarios and have many parallels with the framework used in the later Dutch national 
scenarios such as WLO. The study reached six main conclusions about the generation 
and use of socio-economic scenarios for climate assessments: 
1. There are many audiences for climate-relevant socio-economic futures scenarios: 
Climate change will have many and complex impacts on society and the economy.  
Climate scientists need to know what future societies will be like in order to predict  
vulnerability of different sectors and impact domains to these impacts. Policy inter-
ventions may be needed if major areas of vulnerability are identified. However, climate 
impacts models are not able fully to do justice to the uncertainty of socio-economic  
developments. Socio-economic futures scenarios provide a means for dealing  
systematically with these uncertainties in model-based climate impact assessments. 
Moreover, not all societal responses will be driven by public policy, but by adjustments 
                                                   
21 Parson et al, op cit. 
22 UKCIP, 2001. Socio-economic scenarios for climate change impact assessment: a guide to 
their use in the UK Climate Impacts Programme. Oxford, United Kingdom Climate Impacts 
Programme. 
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and adaptation by organisations and individuals. The UK Climate Impacts Programme 
seeks to encourage each of these actors to become engaged stakeholders in responding to 
climate change impacts. Many of these stakeholders have difficulty in envisioning what 
the future means for themselves. Futures scenarios are one tool for creating this aware-
ness. 
2. There is a desire among different stakeholder groups for a common framework 
against which to assess future vulnerabilities to climate change: While these different 
groups of stakeholders have very different perspectives and interests in thinking about 
the future, the study has revealed a broad-based desire for a common framework. There 
appear to be two motivations for this. First, different groups of stakeholders are looking 
for a robust and 'legitimate' approach to futures analysis. A common, peer-reviewed and 
widely accepted approach would provide this assurance. Second, since the way one 
thinks about the future will have ramifications for present-day actions, a common set of 
futures scenarios also have the potential to transmit messages about appropriate  
responses to climate change. At base, these futures scenarios aim to sharpen stake-
holders' awareness of their vulnerability and resilience to futures climate impacts. 
3. Informed stakeholders make the best use of socio-economic futures scenarios: 
The stakeholder-driven approach is central to the UKCIP. The process of establishing 
who are the relevant stakeholder groups at the UK national level is far advanced, but still 
in its early stages at the regional level (with some notable exceptions). While the futures 
scenarios designed in this study aim to provide a common framework for stakeholders to 
consider their vulnerability to climate change, and their adaptive capacity, this process of 
learning cannot happen without some prior knowledge. The futures scenarios are only 
useful as a planning tool in the hands of an informed stakeholder. Without a prior  
perception of vulnerability to climate impacts many organisations and individuals do not 
engage with the difficult task of visioning the future. And without some knowledge of 
climate change, the process of elaborating the scenarios in a way that is relevant to their 
own concerns is a frustrating task. 
4. Even informed stakeholders find it difficult to accept the need to adapt to climate 
impacts: Elaboration of the scenarios should reveal for stakeholders something about 
their capacity to adapt to changes in climate. In principle, the risk that an organisation 
would have a low capacity to respond should lead to changes in practice. This study has 
revealed that most organisations find it very hard to conceptualise and evaluate their own 
capacity to accommodate change. Most organisations believe they are rather good at  
responding to change, without being able to say exactly why. Without a clearer notion of 
the conditions for and components of adaptive capacity, many organisations will  
continue to find it hard to know what responses they should make in the light of  
alternative futures. Futures thinking will only gain a focus in those sectors where there is 
broad acceptance that it will not be possible to 'muddle through'. This is another  
challenge for the UKCIP. 
5. Changes of behaviour can be precipitated by crises: We have also been reminded 
several times that what worries most stakeholders most about the future is the random, 
catastrophic event, for which they have not planned, and in the face of which muddling 
through is not an option. The scenarios designed in this study do not identify these 'side-
swipes', but concentrate on broad incremental changes in society and the economy. 
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Wars, revolutions, plagues and stock market crashes have occurred frequently in history, 
and no doubt will happen again. These kinds of changes lead to disjunctures in the rate 
and direction of socio-economic change, and often have a bearing on the vulnerability or 
resilience of society to other sorts of change. We acknowledge this weakness at the out-
set, but encourage users of these futures scenarios to stretch them wherever possible to 
'think the unthinkable'. 
6. Scenarios are considered a useful framework for thinking about the future: A 
wide variety of stakeholders find the scenario framework presented here a helpful way of 
visioning the future. There is widespread demand in the climate impacts community for 
a systematic approach for considering socio-economic changes over periods of several 
decades. Without a picture of socio-economic developments, there can be no plausible 
account of climate impacts and responses to them. However, the desire for a consistent 
approach needs to be balanced with a need also to encourage a diversity of approaches. 
The future is uncertain, and not all of that uncertainty can be captured in a single frame-
work for thinking about the future. Robust decisions need to be based on deliberation 
based on many different perspectives. 
In broad terms, these conclusions are endorsed in US CCSP review (2006). The main 
difference of emphasis in on the question of how to handle uncertainty. Parson et al 
(2006) argue that there should be more explicit use of probability statements in  
scenarios, especially in cases where there are relatively fewer variables and fewer users. 
They acknowledge that as scenarios become more multivariate and are used to  
communicate with more users, the role of statements about likelihood declines. The 
question of whether to apply probabilities to socio-economic scenarios has been the  
focus of scientific debate.23 On the one hand, some analysts argue that without probabili-
ties, decision-makers will find it hard to make sense of scenarios and integrate them into 
their analysis and procedures. They also argue that even if scenario-builders do not apply 
probabilities, users implicitly or explicitly will. If this is the case, it is better than the 
scenario-builder himself applies probabilities, even if these are subjective. On the other 
hand, there are those who argue that there are irreducible uncertainties (perhaps  
ignorance is a better word) - related to the emergence of unexpected novelty in the  
future, and also to the reflexivity of actors in response to these novelties (and to  
scenarios themselves) – that cannot be captured by the assignment of probabilities. They 
also argue that under conditions of uncertainty it is more appropriate to adapt to a wide 
set of plausible alternative outcomes (the notion of robustness), than to aligning  
decisions to a rank ordering of those outcomes as a result of assigning probabilities to 
them. Parson et al. offer a reasonable compromise in this dispute. 
                                                   
23 Schneider, S. (2002) Can we estimate the likelihood of climatic changes at 2100?, Climatic 
Change. 52, 451-451; Dessai, S. and M.Hulme (2003) Does climate policy need probabili-
ties?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 34, Norwich: UEA. 
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5. Scenarios in practice 
5.1 Principles in scenario development 
Among the large amount of guidance material on scenario use that exists,24 four criteria 
stand out. Most scenarios practitioners argue that they should be: relevant; consistent; 
plausible; and transparent. That is, scenarios need to be tailored to the needs of the user, 
rather than being seen as an end in themselves. In order to be useful, scenarios should be 
relevant to the worldviews and problem-framing of the user and they need to provide a 
stable pattern through which complex issues and un-certainties can be viewed. Scenarios, 
in order to speak to the user also need to achieve a special status of providing a lens onto 
the unexpected, while also remaining within the realms of the possible. Lastly, the con-
struction of scenarios, either as a hermeneutic structure, or as a social process (who was 
involved, what interests did they represent) also needs to be plain to the user. Without 
these four characteristics, scenarios are likely to fail in their function of informing analy-
sis and facilitating innovation. 
Relevance depends primarily on the overall objectives of a study. The issue of relevance 
is pressing for many of the global studies. Their aim is to describe ‘megatrends’ and to 
develop storylines that suggest possible futures. Such narratives are not easily applied to 
public or private sector decision-making, and this has been widely regarded as a weak-
ness. However, this may be an unfair critique since the role of global scenarios may 
rather be seen as providing a logical structure with which to tell different stories about 
the future – what van Asselt calls ‘future telling’. 
Consistency depends on the way in which a scenario exercise is set up - the ‘dimensions’ 
of change that are included - and whether the treatment of change is model-driven and 
quantified, or schematic and qualitative. Once again, this criterion is frequently harder to 
apply to more global scenarios, which may include several dimensions of change. The 
problem is that the relationship between different dimensions is typically not well  
specified, or treated in a simplified way, according to assumed correlations and causal 
relationships. So, for instance, liberalised markets are typically assumed to be correlated 
with more open trade, more rapid economic growth, weaker international institutions and 
less intensive environmental policy. Many of these relationships are subject to  
substantial academic debate. 
Plausibility is related to the complex issue of probability or uncertainty in scenario 
analysis. Parson et al (2006) argue that representing and communicating uncertainty is 
perhaps the most fundamental purpose of scenarios. They argue that scenarios can be 
seen as fitting within a spectrum of methods for addressing the uncertainty of future 
states. At one end of the spectrum is a probability distribution for a single variable  
communicated to a well-defined audience. At the other end of the spectrum are complex 
scenarios describing future states of many variables whose relationships are in-
completely known, where probability distributions are unknown and which are  
communicated to multiple audiences. Most global and domain studies do not treat  
                                                   
24 For example: Ringland, G. (2002) Scenarios in Public Policy, Wiley: Chichester. 
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plausibility or uncertainty formally (through expressed probabilities, for instance) in any 
of the exercises reviewed here. The number of scenarios presented varies across different 
studies from 1 to 13. Where more scenarios are developed, these are typically organised 
within 3-4 ‘families’ of scenarios with variants (ie. the four SRES (2001) scenario  
families).  
Transparency is seen as crucial to the credibility and legitimacy of scenarios. Without a 
clear exposition of assumptions and approach it will be difficult for audiences to make 
sense of the results, or to trust them sufficiently to use them in their own decisions. 
Global and domain studies face different challenges with regard to transparency. Global 
scenarios need to make clear the frequently qualitative or narrative assumptions that  
underlie their projections. More specific scenario exercises often are based on  
quantitative models that may be extensive and harder to report. Such modelling exercises 
may be costly and time-consuming, unless the relationships being investigated are  
relatively well understood. 
Scenario exercises may be defined as being either exploratory, extrapolatory or  
normative in approach. Exploratory approaches create a stylised ‘model’ of a system 
(such as the scenario-axes technique) and make projections for the system given as-
sumptions about the determinants of change. Most scenario studies take an exploratory 
approach. Extrapolatory approaches come closer to classical forecasting in which  
existing numerical models – which make assumptions about the sign and strength of  
relationships between variables – are used to make projections of the future. While such 
models may be very useful to forecast the relatively near-term, they are typically poor at 
making projections over the longer-term, primarily because relationships between  
variables change with time. Normative studies posit a (desirable) state for the system at 
some future date and then ‘backcast’ to understand what changes need to occur for this 
to be achieved (Dreborg, 1996).25 Many global scenario studies have normative elements 
in the specification of desirable and undesirable outcomes. 
5.2 Scenario applications 
In a related study carried out for the UK Foresight Programme,26 the use of scenarios in 
research and public policy settings was investigated. The review found that that there 
were broadly two, markedly different, applications of scenarios. 
Most frequently, the Foresight Scenarios were used in small-scale scenario planning  
exercises, usually one-off events, which contributed to medium and long-term business 
and policy planning. These included applications in a diverse range of sectors, including 
crime prevention and financial services. These processes usually involved: a  
participative process; a qualitative exploration of trends; drawing on the experience of 
practitioners; with scenarios being used primarily as a communication tool. Frequently 
this type of use depended on a ‘champion’ of scenario planning at a senior level of  
management. Their function was to attract interest and to stimulate creative thinking. 
                                                   
25 Dreborg, K.H., 1996. Essence of backcasting. Futures 28 (9), 813-828. 
26 Berkhout, F. and Hertin, J., Foresight Futures scenarios – developing and applying a participa-
tive strategic planning tool, Greener Management International, 37: Spring 2002: 37-52. 
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These processes tended to engage participants unfamiliar with scenario approaches, and 
often unfamiliar with academic language and thinking. 
Second, the scenarios were used in the context of research-based studies carried out over 
longer periods, often for Government. In these assessments, the main function of  
scenarios was to provide a heuristic framework for coordinating integrated assessments 
by allowing the construction of a coherent set of underpinning assumptions. In particu-
lar, scenarios were used in poorly-structured or complex (multi-variate) areas of research 
and policy, such as climate change impact assessment and water resources planning. 
These uses are characterised through: qualitative and quantitative assessment of potential 
outcomes; scientific methods combined with consultation based on data and expert 
knowledge; with scenarios used to parameterise models and to assess research results. 
One analytical challenge for this approach is to combine the ‘soft’ scenario tool with 
‘hard’, quantitative scientific methods. Simple modelling and cross-impact analysis can 
be employed to ensure consistency and analytical depth. Parson et al. (2006) note that 
this type of application is frequently subject to politically-motivated attempts to  
influence their outcomes. This is mainly because scenario studies like this can have a 
role in framing public debates. 
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6. Conclusions: responses on key issues 
Socio-economic scenarios are likely to have four functions in the KvR research  
programme: 
• They will provide a heuristic frame for researchers to develop consistent models 
of the future; 
• They will provide a range of values for parameters in quantitative analysis; 
• They will serve as a means for coordinating and integrated appraisals by provid-
ing a set of standard assumptions about the future; and 
• They will provide a means of communicating results of KvR research and activi-
ties to a wider set of stakeholders. 
Based on this review of scenarios and their uses, we can offer some initial responses to 
the questions identified in the project proposal: 
6.1 Scenarios as narrative 
What is the right balance between narrative and quantitative aspects of scenarios? 
While global and multivariate socio-economic scenarios have almost all tended to take a 
narrative form since early experiments with ‘global models’, there has been a growing 
tendency towards quantification. There are four main developments: the generation of 
quantitative indicators to illustrate narrative scenarios (UKCIP SES, 1999); the use of 
scenarios to generate parameter values as inputs for modelling exercises (SRES, 2000); 
the integration of numerical modelling into scenario exercises (WLO, 2006); and the use 
of probability statements with scenarios (Schneider, 2002). 
Over what time-periods and spatial-scales should scenarios be expressed? 
Time horizons used in scenario studies vary considerably and in general they should be 
tailored to the goals of the exercise. Generally, scenarios have time horizons that are out-
side conventional planning horizons, but within a foreseeable future. Socio-economic 
scenarios face significant challenges in reconciling the long-term projections of many 
climate scenarios (up to 80 or more years forward) and the salience of such time  
horizons for socio-economic projections and for scenario users. Reconciling these two 
perspectives typically leads to the segmenting of time horizons (for instance, scenarios to 
2030, to 2060 and to 2100). But this segmentation may be difficult to sustain in narrative 
scenarios which project visions of future states, without saying much about processes or 
rates of change. There may therefore be a measure of arbitrariness in the association of 
specific time horizons to qualitative socio-economic scenario projections. This weakness 
may be reduced in scenarios using more quantitative modelling. 
Somewhat different problems arise with respect to the spatial scale. Climate models are 
only partially-scaleable, although models continue to generate renditions of physcial 
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changes at ever-smaller scales of resolution.27 This is in order to be able to make more 
specific predictions of the sign and rate of physical changes in different regions and  
locations. However, for many users, the spatial aggregation offered is still too coarse, 
and this, combined with the high uncertainties attached to regional projections, means 
that climate scenarios still convey only limited information. Socio-economic scenarios 
are, in principle, infinitely-scaleable – that is, a scenario can be presented at any geo-
graphical, economic or social scale. But the smaller the scale of resolution, the less  
informative the scenario is likely to be, since larger trends and uncertainties will become 
exogenous factors, rather than variables within the analysis. Global scenarios frequently 
choose a global region disaggregation, while many socio-economic studies are purely 
national in scope (often also taking account of global contexts). Here too, there may be a 
tension between the scale of the scenario and the real interests of the user – which will 
frequently be at a lower spatial level. 
What domains and variables need to be reported on? 
Socio-economic scenarios have proven extremely flexible instruments with the choice of 
domains and variables entirely at the discretion of the analyst or user. This may also  
include unconventional domains and variables that would be difficult to treat more  
formally, in models for instance. Socio-economic scenarios for climate assessments are 
likely to include climate-sensitive sectors and domains such as: eco-systems; water; 
coastal zones; agriculture; the built environment; resource-intensive sectors, infra-
structures; and tourism. 
How finely-specified should scenarios be? 
Related to the question of scale, in principal the specification of scenarios should be  
determined by the purpose and users of scenarios. 
6.2 Scenarios and user groups 
Who are the main user communities? 
There appear to be two major user communities for global and domain scenarios: public 
policy makers and researchers. The UKCIP study showed that these different groups 
used scenarios in particular ways. Policymakers use scenarios quickly as a way of  
framing or interpreting policy issues. Researchers use scenarios in a more on-going way 
as a means of generating parameters and insights, and to communicate results. 
What are key climate-relevant uncertainties for different user groups and how are 
they currently handled? 
It is clear that the climate impacts relevant to different user groups vary. While heat may 
be a primary consideration for architects and engineers of buildings, precipitation and 
windstorm may be the main consideration for farmers. Additionally, very different  
features of the socio-economic landscape will be relevant for such groups. Once again, 
                                                   
27 For instance the Hadley suite of models have a range of spatial resolutions: regional climate 
models have a resolution of 0.44x0.44º; while the Hadley GCM has a resolution of 
1.875x1.25º (Source: Arnell, N.W. et al. (2003) Climate change scenarios from a regional 
climate model: Estimating change in runoff in southern Africa, Journal of Geophysical Re-
search. 108 (D16): 4519. 
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scenario development needs to be done with close attention for the expressed needs of 
users. 
How should users and stakeholders be consulted in the development of scenarios? 
While stressing the importance of involving stakeholders, the studies reviewed here are 
not very explicit about the best means for consulting them. Small workshops in which 
participants are encouraged to take part in scenario construction are often a feature, as 
are interviews. The US CCSP study argues that these interactions are most useful at the 
beginning and end of scenario exercises, and most useful when small groups are  
involved. The UKCIP experience is that consultation with wider stakeholder groups is 
possible and useful. 
What are for them relevant features of scenario narratives and parameters? 
Here too there is diversity. For some users, scenarios are useful in issue-framing, and for 
these groups the underlying logics are important. For other groups, the content of scenar-
ios is unimportant, but their outputs in terms of parameter values are. For these groups, 
the status of scenarios – defined as their source or authorship – is sufficient to give them 
credibility and therefore make them useful. This partly explains why the SRES scenarios 
(developed in the context of the IPCC) have been so widely-used. 
6.3 Communication of scenarios 
What is the most effective way to communicate with potential users? 
Most scenarios appear in the form of reports – often long ones. There have been attempts 
more recently to use visualisations (either in the text or virtually). In these kinds of  
applications, there is also the notion that it will be possible through simulation  
approaches to make it possible for users to interact with the scenario – an idea derived 
from gaming. In fact, there has been little progress towards this goal. 
How should scenario narratives and resources be communicated so that they  
integrate with users’ practices? 
User practices and interests are diverse and this suggests that scenario outputs should be 
similarly diverse. This does not mean that the scenario developer will always be capable 
of providing these outputs. In those cases where specific outputs cannot be delivered – 
for lack of knowledge or method, for instance – the aim of the scenario-developer will be 
to place the scenario framework in the hands of the user, who can produce the outputs 
himself. 
What is the right balance between consistency and the desire for flexibility in apply-
ing scenarios? 
There is no clear answer to this question. Users frequently want both consistency – to be 
comparable and linked to an authoritative ‘source’ scenario – while also aiming for  
relevance and therefore specificity. Each scenario exercise needs to make these  
judgements separately. 
 
 
What is the role of scenarios in pluralistic contexts? 
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Scenarios can have an important role in aligning the ideas and assumptions of different 
stakeholder groups. In this sense, they may serve to generate learning between different 
groups. 
6.4 Treatment of uncertainty 
How is uncertainty treated in scenario studies? 
There seems to be a paradoxical course in which initial uncertainty awareness is  
compromised by increasing uncertainty intolerance and all kinds of solidifying efforts 
which in the ends lead to outlooks presented as definite and solid accounts about an  
uncertain future. On the one hand, it is clear that such ‘certainification’ enables  
practitioners to proceed.  
Can discontinuities and extremes be dealt with in scenarios? 
The idea of discontinuity seems to appeal to scenario specialists, especially in the early 
phases, it seems that in the course of a foresight endeavour, radical outlooks get increas-
ingly disqualified as exotic, implausible or unrealistic. In the end, the discontinuous  
repertoire is often marginalised in the foresight practice. 
